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Abstract 
 
From 1735 to 1751, the Board of Trustees of the Province of Georgia imposed 
the only ban on slavery among the North American colonies. Exploiting the 
historical boundary between the 88 counties of Trustee Georgia and the 71 
counties that were appended to the colony after 1751, I analyze the effects of 
this initial institutional difference on subsequent differences in slave 
dependence, land inequality, income, and poverty.  I find that counties that 
had been covered by the initial Trustee ban subsequently had lower slave 
population density, fewer farms holding more than 10 slaves, and higher income 
and lower poverty rates today.  I further find that while counties affected by 
the ban did not have significant differences in pre-Civil War land inequality, 
productivity, industrial development, or educational investment, their 
economic output was significantly more diversified and less reliant upon the 
production of cash crops.  Finally, I demonstrate that controlling for pre-war 
output diversification significantly reduces the estimated relationship between 
Trusteeship and current income.  Results therefore suggest that the effects of 
initial differences in labor institutions can persist even where those differences 
are not determined by geography, and that a primary channel of persistence is 
the path-dependence of early economic specialization.     
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1 Introduction 
 
A large and growing academic literature, building on the work of Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997, 2002, 2006), has demonstrated that historical instances of forced labor systems generated 
persistent, negative effects on contemporary economic outcomes (Nunn 2008; Dell 2010; 
Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2012).  In the original Engerman and Sokoloff 
hypothesis, coercive labor institutions were historically more likely to emerge where geographic 
conditions were particularly suited to production activities exhibiting economies of scale which 
could be most profitably conducted using large-scale forced labor, and these institutions in turn 
had negative effects on long-run development.  Though Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesized 
that initial economic inequality was the primary mechanism by which slavery adversely 
affected long-run economic outcomes, subsequent research has emphasized political inequality, 
differences in land tenure systems, and the provision of public goods as important 
intermediating channels of institutional persistence (Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubín, and 
Robinson 2007; Dell 2010, Iyer 2010; Ager 2013).   
In this paper I exploit institutional discontinuity within a single political entity to more 
precisely identify the potential channels through which slavery influenced long-run economic 
outcomes, and also to evaluate whether initial differences in coercive labor institutions persist 
even where those differences were not geographically determined. From 1735—three years after 
its founding—until 1751, the North American Province of Georgia, including 88 of the 159 
counties constituting the modern state of Georgia, prohibited the selling, purchase, or owning 
of slaves. The ban was not the decision of the colonists themselves, but rather was exogenously 
imposed by a Board of Trustees in London. Concerned that slavery would give rise to an idle 
and decadent aristocratic elite, the Board maintained the ban until pressure from colonial 
lobbyists forced its repeal in 1751.  In contrast, slavery was never prohibited during the colonial 
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period in the remaining 71 counties of the modern state of Georgia, which were formally added 
to the colony in 1763. 
I therefore employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate average differences in 
long-run economic outcomes in Georgian counties affected by the initial Trustee ban on slavery 
versus long-run outcomes in contiguous border counties that were unaffected by the ban, 
controlling for a comprehensive set of observable geographic characteristics.  Whereas previous 
studies have included slave density—which is likely correlated with other, unobservable district 
characteristics which are in turn correlated with differential long-run economic outcomes—as 
an independent variable, in this paper I exploit county inclusion in Trustee Georgia as an 
exogenously determined “intention-to-treat” with subsequently lower slave intensity, with 
contiguously paired non-Trustee counties constituting the untreated control group.   
I find that relative to contiguous non-Trustee counties, in 2010 median household income 
was 11.3% higher in former Trustee counties, and the poverty rate 2.091 percentage points 
lower.  I also find that by 1860, the ratio of slaves to total county population was 10.5 
percentage points lower in former Trustee counties, versus in contiguous non-Trustee counties, 
and that the percentage of farms holding more than 10 slaves was 6.2 percentage points lower 
in former Trustee counties, versus in contiguous non-Trustee counties.  I further find that 
including slave density in 1860 as an explanatory variable attenuates the estimated relationship 
between Trusteeship and 2010 income and yields a large, negative estimated coefficient on 
slave density, which suggests that the positive effect of Trusteeship on long-run development 
can be accounted for by its large effect on subsequent slave intensity. 
Exploring possible channels of persistence, I find that by 1860, the cash crop share of total 
crop output by value was 3.7 percentage points lower in Trustee counties than in contiguous 
non-Trustee border counties.  Similarly, by 1860, the average Herfindahl index score of output 
by category in Trustee counties was 0.021 points lower than in contiguous non-Trustee 
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counties, indicating that Trustee county economies were significantly more diversified by the 
eve of the Civil War than non-Trustee counties. In particular, per capita production of orchard, 
market garden, homemade manufactures, and livestock was $105.14 higher in Trustee versus 
non-Trustee counties.  Moreover, including Herfindahl score and cash crop share of total crop 
output in 1860 as explanatory variables attenuates the estimated relationship between 
Trusteeship and 2010 income and yields large, negative estimated coefficients on both variables. 
I further find that land inequality was no greater by 1784 or 1860 in Trustee versus 
contiguous non-Trustee counties, and that by 1860 Trusteeship had exhibited no effect on the 
number of manufacturing establishments nor the volume of capital invested in manufacturing, 
no effect on differences in rail and water transport links, no effect on school enrollment or the 
number of educational institutions, no effect on per capita productivity, and a negative 
estimated effect on per capita wealth.  The adult literacy rate, however, was 3.8 percentage 
points higher before the Civil War in Trustee counties versus contiguous non-Trustee counties, 
and in the aftermath of the Civil War, sharecropping was a significantly less prevalent form of 
farm tenancy in Trustee versus contiguous non-Trustee counties.   
The results of this paper therefore lend additional support to the hypothesis that slavery 
had a persistent, negative effect on long-run economic development, and furthermore provide 
new evidence that greater dependence on cash crops and lower diversification of economic 
output were important channels through which slavery affected long-run outcomes.  Results 
also indicate that initial economic inequality and the provision of public goods, particularly 
public schooling, were not channels through which slavery affected long-run outcomes, though 
literacy specifically and post-Civil War differences in land tenure were associated with 
differences in long-run economic outcomes.  More broadly, the results presented in this paper 
suggest that initial differences in coercive labor institutions can persist even where those 
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differences were not shaped by geography, and that a primary mechanism of that persistence 
is simply the path dependence of economic specialization in commodity production.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is thus as follows. Section 2 provides 
historical background on the creation of the Province of Georgia and the period of Trustee 
rule. Section 3 details the data sources used for the analysis, while Section 4 describes the 
empirical approach.  Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Historical Background 
 
The Province of Georgia was the last English colony founded in North America.  Following 
a lengthy application process, in June 1732 King George II granted to James Oglethorpe, 
retired general and Member of Parliament, along with twenty other English trustees, a 
corporate charter to establish a new colony, investing them with the powers to elect their own 
governing Board of Trustees, make land grants, and enact their own laws and taxes. Carved 
out of the unsettled and largely unexplored borderlands of the older royal Province of South 
Carolina, which had previously encompassed all of the territory of the present-day state of 
Georgia, the new colony was to include: 
“all those lands, countries and territories lying and being in that part of South Carolina, in 
America, which lies from the most northern part of a stream or river commonly called the 
Savannah, all along the sea coast to the southward, unto the most southern stream of a certain 
other great water or river called the Altamaha; and westerly from the heads of the said rivers 
respectively, in direct lines to the south seas, and all that shore, circuit and precinct of lands 
within the said boundaries” (Georgia Charter 1732) 
As the trustees themselves possessed no firsthand knowledge of the new territories, 
their vision for the colony was largely based on second- and third-hand accounts of varying 
accuracy (Wood 2007).  The northern boundary of the Savannah River was thus chosen 
for the simple reason that it had previously constituted the southern limit of English 
settlement, following an agreement between South Carolina and the native Creek tribes at 
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the end of the Yamasee War of 1715-17 (Paulett 2012).  The choice of the Altamaha River 
as the province’s southern boundary, meanwhile, owed primarily to the prior existence of 
a fort, Fort King George, at the river’s coastal mouth, and to a strategic desire to leave an 
unoccupied neutral buffer zone between the new province’s southern border and the 
northern border of Spanish Florida along the St. Marys River.  These borders then 
remained unchanged until 1763, when further territorial concessions following the Seven 
Years’ War, again by the Creeks, at the Treaty of Augusta extended the province’s 
southern border from the Altamaha to the St. Marys River, where the territory formerly 
nominally claimed by the Province of South Carolina bordered Florida, and its western to 
the Chattahoochee River, thereby incorporating all of the present-day state of Georgia 
(Miller 2011).  
In establishing the Province of Georgia, named in honor of George II, the trustees were 
motivated first and foremost by a desire to promote “a Christian, moral and industrious 
way of life,” which they believed would create “a simple and stable society made up of 
contented citizens,” living “by labour … a comfortable subsistence.”  With this aim in mind, 
they were determined to avoid the emergence of a planter aristocracy as existed in 
neighboring South Carolina, which they believed degraded white manners and morals.  The 
trustees were by no means abolitionists, but rather opponents of the extreme inequalities 
of plantation economies which, in their view, encouraged “idleness” and “luxury” among 
aristocratic white society.  Such idleness and luxury, they felt, was as morally corrupting 
as the “idleness and necessity” of grinding poverty, escape from which they hoped the new 
colony would offer the poor, “miserable wretches” of Great Britain (Wood 2007).      
It was thus in an effort to prevent such extreme inequality, which they viewed as 
morally corrupting, that in 1734 the trustees drafted legislation to prohibit the institution 
of slavery within the province, receiving royal assent in 1735.  Though the ban subsequently 
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received opposition from many of the province’s colonists, particularly among lowland 
Scottish settlers near Savannah, it remained in place and enforced until proponents of 
legalization effectively lobbied Parliament directly for repeal of the ban (Coleman 2006; 
Wood 2007; Reese 2010).  From 1 January, 1751, therefore, slavery became legal in all of 
the Province of Georgia, as it had remained legal since 1735 in those regions which would 
become part of the colony following the boundary changes in the aftermath of the Seven 
Years’ War.  The following year, having failed to secure a new government subsidy upon 
expiration of its 20-year charter, Trustee rule in Georgia came to an end, such that from 
May 1752 the province officially became a crown colony (Reese 2010).  
3 Data 
I examine the long-run impact of the Georgia Experiment on economic development by 
testing whether it affects living standards today.  Counties assigned to Trustee Georgia are 
determined by the text of the Royal Charter of 1732, which granted the province all lands 
lying between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers, up to their headwaters and extending 
westward “sea to sea.”1 The territories now comprising the remaining counties of the present-
day state of Georgia, likewise formerly territories of the Province of South Carolina, were then 
incorporated into the colony in 1763.  My analysis uses two distinct samples: a sample of all 
Georgian counties and a subset sample of contiguous border counties exploiting the original 
Province of Georgia border (see Figure 1). To control for potential non-randomness in the 
geographic characteristics of Trustee versus non-Trustee counties, I include latitude, longitude, 
land and water surface area, area-weighted soil type, mean elevation, and mean annual 
temperature and precipitation as independent variables.  Latitude, longitude, and land and 
                                                          
1 The headwaters of the Savannah were specified as where the Chattooga River, which becomes the 
Savannah below Lake Hartwell, crosses the 35th parallel.  The headwaters of the Altamaha are where 
the Ocmulgee River meets Jackson Lake. 
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water surface area are from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Area-weighted primary soil type is from 
the Web Soil Survey, which provides soil data produced by the National Cooperative Soil 
Survey and operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources Conservation 
Service.  Mean elevation data is from The National Map, produced by the U.S. Geological 
Survey, and 1981-2010 mean annual temperature and precipitation is from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Climatic Data Center. 
Historical population data, including county-level slave population data, is from the U.S. 
decennial censuses from 1790 through 1860.  Contemporary median household income and 
poverty rate data are from the 2010 U.S. census.  The 1850 census additionally provides 
statistics for literacy by age group, school enrollment by age group, and the number of colleges, 
academies, and public schools.  The 1860 offers data on aggregate wealth (which I define as 
the sum of real estate, personal estate—including farming implements and machinery, and 
livestock—and capital invested in manufacturing), aggregate production by value, water and 
railroad transportation (binary variables equal to 1 if there were commercial water or rail 
transport routes in the county), and the number of manufacturing establishments.  The 1860 
census further subdivides production value by category, including 33 different crops, as well as 
orchard products, market garden products, manufactures, and animals slaughtered.  From 
these production statistics I am able to construct a Herfindahl index of output diversity of the 
form  
N
i isH 1
2 , where si is the value share of crop i in overall county-level production, and 
N = 37, the number of census-designated production categories.   
Data on the number of farms by farm size is also available from the 1860 census, though 
for county-level land Gini coefficients I use coefficients constructed by Nunn (2008).  In 
addition, for pre-census data on landholding, I use the Georgia Colonial and Headright Plat 
Index, a compilation of registered Georgian land grants through 1866.  Though most colonial 
land grant records no longer exist, the first post-colonial survey, in 1784, is included in the 
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index, listing the name of the person for whom the land was surveyed and the number of acres.   
The 1784 survey covers 36 counties, for which I am therefore able to construct land Gini 
coefficients.  Unfortunately, as the sample includes only 32 Trustee counties and 4 non-Trustee 
counties, there are an insufficient number of contiguous border county pairs for subset analysis.  
The number of farmers by type of tenure (owned, cash-rented, or share-rented) in 1900 and 
1940 are from the decennial censuses for those years. 
4 Empirical Framework 
The empirical approach is based on estimating average differences in long-run economic 
outcomes in Georgian counties covered by the initial Trustee ban on slavery, versus long-run 
outcomes in counties that were unaffected by the ban.  The baseline cross-sectional estimating 
equation is therefore 
Yc = α + βTrust + Xcꞌδ + εc             (1) 
where Yc is the outcome variable of interest for county c; Trust is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if county c was part of Trustee Georgia and equal to 0 otherwise; Xc is a vector of county-
level covariates that includes geographic center latitude and longitude, primary area-weighted 
soil classification, county land and water surface area, mean annual temperature and 
precipitation, and mean elevation; and εc is an error term encompassing all other omitted 
factors, with E(εc) = 0 for all c.   
Because it is possible that there were other, unobservable county characteristics that were 
correlated both with initial Trusteeship and subsequent differences in observed outcomes, I 
also employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate average differences in long-run 
economic outcomes in Georgian counties covered by the initial Trustee ban on slavery versus 
long-run outcomes in contiguous border counties that were unaffected by the ban.  Exploiting 
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this sharp spatial discontinuity at each county border, I therefore estimate a modified version 
of equation (1) of the form 
Ycb = α + βTrust + Xcꞌδ + ϕb + εcb                      (2) 
where Ycb is the outcome variable of interest for county c along contiguous border county pair 
b; Trust is again an indicator variable equal to 1 if county c was part of Trustee Georgia and 
equal to 0 otherwise; Xc is a vector of county-level covariates that includes geographic center 
latitude and longitude, primary area-weighted soil classification, county land and water surface 
area, mean annual temperature and precipitation, and mean elevation; ϕb is a set of contiguous 
county pair-specific time fixed effects, and εcb is an error term.2  Because they generally share 
similar geographic, cultural, and economic covariates, contiguous border counties offer a 
plausible control group.  The identifying assumption is thus that E(Trust, εcb) = 0, that is, 
that assignment to Trustee Georgia within each contiguously adjacent county pair is 
uncorrelated with differences in outcome residuals in either county. 
The advantage of including the variable for Trusteeship in lieu of slave density—as previous 
studies have done—as an independent variable is that it serves as a plausibly exogenous 
intention-to-treat instrument.  The acquisition of slaves constituted a substantial fixed capital 
investment, such that plantation production relying on slave labor exhibited declining unit 
costs and increasing returns to scale, which can generate path dependence as early volume 
leaders retain a cost advantage (Anderson and Gallman 1977).3  Exogenous assignment to 
Trustee Georgia, with its initial 16-year ban on slavery, therefore offers a valid intention-to-
treat with the treatment of lower subsequent slave intensity.  Nonetheless, to examine whether 
                                                          
2 Note that Ycb and εcb indicate that counties may be repeated for all contiguous border pairs that 
they are a part of. 
3 An additional reason for assignment to Trustee Georgia to exert a persistent effect on subsequent 
slave intensity is that after reaching a century low in the 1740s, the price of slaves in the deep South 
rose sharply after the 1750s, placing new entrants into labor-intensive agriculture at a distinct cost 
disadvantage to existing slaveholders (Mancall, Rosenbloom, and Weisss 2001). 
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this is the case, I also estimate modifications of Eqs. (1) and (2) for current income and poverty 
rate, including slave population density in 1860, of the form: 
Yc = α + βTrust + γSc/Lc + Xcꞌδ + εc                (3) 
and 
Ycb = α + βTrust + γSc/Lc + Xcꞌδ + ϕb + εcb                    (4) 
where Sc/Lc is the proportion of slaves in the total population in county c.  If assignment to 
Trustee Georgia affects long-run outcomes only through its effect on subsequent slave intensity, 
then controlling for slave density should significantly reduce any estimated relationship 
between Trusteeship and income. 
The primary potential threat to identification is that county assignment to Trustee Georgia 
is in fact correlated with other, unobservable variables that are in turn correlated with 
differential long-run economic outcomes.  This might be the case if 1) additional, unobservable 
county-level geographic characteristics are both correlated with differential outcomes and vary 
systematically across the discontinuity threshold; 2) unobservable settler characteristics, 
including culture, vary systematically across the discontinuity threshold and are correlated 
with differential outcomes; or 3) the Trustee boundary coincides with additional policy 
discontinuities that are also correlated with differential long-run outcomes.   
Though including the listed geographic control variables and restricting the analysis to 
border counties and exploiting contiguously paired counties as a control group should attenuate 
all three potential sources of omitted variable bias, there are additional historical reasons why 
omitted variable bias should not pose a threat to identification.  First, the provincial boundary 
was exogenously imposed on the colony by Parliament and the Trustees in England, none of 
whom had visited the region nor possessed accurate knowledge of its geographic characteristics. 
To bound the new political entity, the drafters of the 1732 charter thus simply relied on the 
known locations of two regional rivers, the Savannah and the Altamaha. 
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Second, discontinuity in settler characteristics would require both that those who settled 
in the Province of Georgia between 1732 and 1752 differed systematically from those who 
settled contemporaneously in those counties which were not part of Georgia province between 
1732 and 1752, and that these differences at the discontinuity threshold could persist through 
subsequent waves of immigration and population growth.  There is no historical evidence that 
this was the case.  Moreover, far from possessing any moral or cultural hostility toward the 
institution of slavery that may have differed from views held by settlers on the other side of 
the discontinuity threshold, the settlers of Trustee Georgia aggressively and repeatedly lobbied 
the Board of Trustees for repeal of the ban almost from the province’s inception.  The initial 
ban was not a choice of the settlers themselves, but was rather imposed upon them by the 
Trustees in London (Wood, 2007).   
Third, both Trustee and non-Trustee Georgia were formerly unsettled and un-administered 
territory of the Province of South Carolina, inhabited by the same Native American tribes—
principally the Creek, Yamacraw, and Cherokee tribes—whose territorial concessions 
constituted both the original province as well as those non-Trustee regions that were 
incorporated into the colony in 1763.  From 1763, both the former Trustee and non-Trustee 
counties were part of the same colony of Georgia and subsequently state of Georgia.  Therefore, 
there should be no additional policy discontinuities that coincide with the Trustee boundary 
and correlate with differential long-run outcomes.    
5 Results 
5.1 Long-run effects of initial Trustee status 
Results of estimating Eqs. (1) and (2) for average differences in patterns of slave-holding 
and long-run income and poverty, for both the main sample (panel A) and border county sub-
sample (panel B) are reported in Table 1.  The estimated coefficient reported in column 1, 
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panel A indicates that by 1860, the ratio of slaves to total county population was 9.8 percentage 
points lower in former Trustee counties, where slavery was initially banned, than in non-
Trustee counties.  Restricting the analysis to the border county sub-sample, the estimated 
coefficient reported in column 1, panel B indicates that by 1860, the ratio of slaves to total 
county population was 10.5 percentage points lower in former Trustee counties, versus non-
Trustee counties.  Figure 2 plots estimated coefficients (β’s from Eq. (1)) for average differences 
in slave population density in Trustee vs. non-Trustee counties for each decennial census year 
from 1790 to 1860.   For every census year before the Civil War, slave population density was 
lower in counties that had been affected by the Trustee ban on slavery, compared to counties 
that were unaffected by the ban.  
Trusteeship was also associated with a lower fraction of farms holding more than 10 slaves.  
Estimated coefficients reported in column 2, panel A of Table 1 reveal that the percentage of 
farms holding more than 10 slaves was 8.1 percentage points lower in former Trustee counties, 
relative to in non-Trustee counties.  Analyzing the border county sub-sample, the estimated 
coefficient reported in column 2, panel B indicates that by 1860, the percentage of farms 
holding more than 10 slaves was a non-statistically significant 6.2 percentage points lower in 
former Trustee counties, versus non-Trustee counties. 
Estimated coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 also reveal that Trusteeship 
was strongly associated with long-run differences in median household income and poverty 
rates.  Relative to non-Trustee counties, by 2010 median household income was 14.1% higher 
in former Trustee counties, and the poverty rate 4.091 percentage points lower.  Restricting 
the analysis to the border-county sample, estimated coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4, 
panel B indicate that by 2010 median household income was 11.3% higher in former Trustee 
counties, versus non-Trustee counties, and the poverty rate 2.783 percentage points lower. 
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Results of estimating Eqs. (3) and (4) for average differences in 2010 income and poverty, 
with slave population density (Sc/Lc) included as an independent variable, for both the main 
sample (panel A) and border county sub-sample (panel B) are reported in Table 2.  Estimated 
coefficients reported in column 1 indicate that including slave density as an independent 
variable significantly reduces estimated coefficients for Trustee status.  The estimated effect of 
Trustee status on current income declines from a statistically significant 14.1% to a non-
statistically significant 4.9%, in the main sample, and from 11.3% to a non-statistically 
significant 4.4% in the border county sub-sample.  Estimated coefficients reported in column 
2 also reveal that the estimated effect of Trustee status on current poverty rates declines in 
magnitude from -4.091 percentage points to -3.106 percentage points, in the main sample, and 
from -2.783 percentage points to a non-statistically significant -2.025 percentage points in the 
border county sub-sample.  Meanwhile, the estimated effect of a 1-percentage point increase in 
slave density (Sc/Lc), is 25.8% lower median household income in 2010 (30.6% lower in the 
border county sub-sample), and a 5.432-percentage point higher poverty rate (10.316 
percentage points in the border county sub-sample).  Results presented in Table 2 therefore 
strongly suggest that the estimated relationship between Trusteeship and long-run economic 
development can be accounted for by the relationship between Trusteeship and subsequent 
slave intensity. 
Results reported in Table 3, however, suggest that while by 1900 Trustee counties were on 
average wealthier than non-Trustee counties—by an estimated $6,202.80 per person—by the 
eve of the Civil War, in 1860, Trustee counties were no more or less developed than non-
Trustee counties.  Analyzing the main sample of all Georgian counties reveals, as reported in 
column 1, that wealth per capita was no higher in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties, and, 
in fact, restricting the analysis to the border county sub-sample reveals that wealth per capita 
was lower in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties, by $274.36 per person. Output per capita 
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in 1860 was also no higher or lower in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties, as reported in 
column 2.  Likewise, estimated coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 indicate 
that Trustee counties were by 1860 no more or less likely to have water or rail transport links.  
Estimated coefficients reported in columns 5 and 6 also indicate that Trustee counties did not 
have more manufacturing establishments, nor a larger volume of capital invested in 
manufacturing, than non-Trustee counties.  
Results presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 therefore strongly indicate that belonging to Trustee 
Georgia had a significant, positive effect on income and negative effect on poverty rates over 
the very long run, and that these relationships are largely accounted for by the effect of 
Trusteeship on subsequent slave density.  Results further suggest that significant divergence 
in development between Trustee and non-Trustee counties did not occur before the Civil War. 
 
5.2 Potential channels of persistence 
 
In this section, I use historical census data to test potential channels of persistence.  Though 
there are many potential channels through which belonging to Trustee Georgia affected long-
run economic development, I focus on four that speak to the extant literature on the question 
of slavery and development, and of which available historical data permits analysis.  These are 
inequality in land ownership, land tenure, provision of public goods, specifically education, and 
economic diversification.  Results suggest that Trusteeship did not have a significant long-run 
effect on land inequality, nor on the provision of formal schooling.  Results do, however, 
indicate that Trusteeship had a strong, positive long-run effect on non-slave adult literacy and 
diversification of economic output, and a strong, negative long-run effect on cash crop 
dependence. 
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Table 4 reports estimated coefficients for the effects of Trusteeship on non-slave adult 
literacy, non-slave school enrollment rate (as a fraction of non-slave county population under 
the age of 21), and the number of colleges, public schools, and academies in 1850, the only pre-
Civil War decennial census for which such statistics are available.  Results reveal that 
Trusteeship had no effect on the number of colleges, public schools, or academies, and no effect 
on school enrollment rate.  The estimated coefficient reported in column 1, panel A, however, 
reveals that relative to non-Trustee counties, the rate of adult illiteracy in Trustee counties 
was 8.8 percentage points lower in 1850.  Restricting the analysis to the border county sub-
sample (panel B), the estimated coefficient indicates that adult illiteracy was 3.8 percentage 
points lower in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  Thus, though the provision of formal 
schooling before the Civil War did not vary systematically across the discontinuity threshold, 
adults were more literate in counties that had been affected by the initial Trustee ban on 
slavery than in unaffected counties. 
In the Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis, slavery was causally related to long-run economic 
development through its strong, positive effect on initial economic inequality, specifically land 
inequality.  However, results presented in Table 5 suggest that Trusteeship was not negatively 
correlated with land inequality.  Estimated coefficients reported in column 1, panel A reveal 
that by 1784, the first year for which landholding data is available, the average Gini coefficient 
was in fact 0.057 points higher in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  By 1860, the average 
Gini coefficient was still higher by 0.032 points in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties, in the 
main sample, and by a non-statistically significant 0.025 points in the border county sub-
sample (panel B).  Results therefore suggest that the distribution of land pre Civil War was 
more unequal in counties in which slavery was initially banned, versus in counties where it was 
not. 
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However, estimated coefficients reported in column 2 of Table 5 suggest that while overall 
inequality in landholding was greater in former Trustee counties than in non-Trustee counties, 
the frequency of very large landholdings was initially lower.  By 1784, the fraction of all 
landholdings over 500 acres was 5.3 percentage points lower in Trustee versus non-Trustee 
counties, though by 1860 the estimated difference had declined to a non-statistically significant 
1.7 percentage points (2.3 percentage points in the border county sub-sample). 
Estimated coefficients reported in column 3 of Table 5 indicate that Trusteeship had a 
significant long-term effect on patterns of land tenure.  By 1900, the fraction of farmholdings 
operated by sharecropping tenants was 9.8 percentage points lower in Trustee versus non-
Trustee counties, in the main sample of all counties, and 7.8 percentage points lower in the 
border county sub-sample.  As late as 1940, the fraction of farmholdings operated by 
sharecropping tenants was still 4.1 percentage points lower in Trustee versus non-Trustee 
counties (6.6 percentage points lower in the border county sub-sample). 
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 5 report the effects of Trusteeship on diversification of 
economic output.  Estimated coefficients reported in column 4 indicate that Trusteeship was 
persistently negatively correlated with Herfindahl index scores of economic output, implying 
that economic output was less concentrated in a few product categories in Trustee counties 
versus in non-Trustee counties.  By 1860, the average Herfindahl index score in Trustee 
counties was 0.019 points lower than in non-Trustee counties (0.021 points lower in the border 
county sub-sample), and by 1940 was 0.073 points lower (0.136 points lower in the border 
county sub-sample).4  Reliance on the principal cash crops of cotton, tobacco, indigo, cane 
sugar, and rice was also lower before the Civil War in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  In 
1860, the cash crop share of total crop output by value was 8.5 percentage points lower in 
                                                          
4 Unfortunately since the 1900 census reports production in incommensurable physical units, it is 
not possible to construct Herfindahl index scores of output by value. 
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Trustee counties versus in non-Trustee counties (3.7 percentage points lower in the border 
county sub-sample).  In the very long run, however, cash crop dependence does not appear to 
have varied systematically between Trustee and non-Trustee counties; by 1940, the cash crop 
share of total crop output by value was a non-statistically significant 3.3 percentage points 
lower in Trustee counties versus in non-Trustee counties (2.2 percentage points in the border 
county sub-sample).  Contrary to less reliance on cash crops, on the eve of the Civil War, per 
capita output of orchard, market garden, homemade manufactures, and slaughtered livestock 
was significantly higher in Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  By 1860, per capita output 
of these products was $86.13 higher in Trustee counties than in non-Trustee counties.  
Restricting the analysis to the border county sub-sample, per capita output of these products 
in 1860 was $135.14 higher in Trustee counties.5 
To further test whether greater economic diversification was an intermediating channel 
through which the initial Trustee ban on slavery affected long-run development, I estimate 
modifications of Eqs. (1) and (2) by including Herfindahl index score and cash crop share of 
total crop output by value in 1860 as explanatory variables: 
Yc = α + βTrust + γHc + λCashc + Xcꞌδ + εc                (5) 
and 
Ycb = α + βTrust + γHc + λCashc + + Xcꞌδ + ϕb + εcb                    (6) 
where Hc is the 1860 Herfindahl index score of 37 census-designated production categories in 
county c and Cashc is the cash crop share of total crop output by value.  Results for the main 
sample of all Georgian counties are reported in Table 6. 
Results reported in column 1 of Table 6 indicate that when we include the cash crop share 
of total crop output by value in 1860 as an explanatory variable, the estimated coefficient on 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, subsequent censuses to not provide commensurate statistics on orchard, market 
garden, home manufactures, and slaughtered livestock. 
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Trusteeship declines from a statistically significant 0.141 to a non-statistically significant 0.013, 
while the estimated coefficient on cash crop share is a statistically significant -0.317.  This 
suggests that greater reliance on the production of cash crops was one channel through which 
the Trustee ban on slavery affected long-run development. Similarly, results reported in column 
2 of Table 6 indicate that when we include Herfindahl index score in 1860 as an explanatory 
variable, the estimated coefficient on Trusteeship again declines, to a non-statistically 
significant 0.031, while the estimated coefficient on Herfindahl score is a statistically significant 
-1.890, meaning a 1-point increase in a county’s Herfindahl index score was associated with 
1.890% lower median household income in 2010. 
However, results reported in column 3 of Table 6 reveal that when both Herfindahl index 
score and cash crop share of total crop output are included as explanatory variables, the 
estimated coefficient for cash crop share of crop output drops by almost half, and is no longer 
statistically significant, while the estimated coefficient for Herfindahl score remains a 
statistically significant -1.452 and the estimated coefficient for Trustee a non-statistically 
significant 0.023.  This suggests that greater reliance upon cash crops did not independently 
affect long-run development, but rather was negatively correlated with greater overall economic 
diversification, which was positively correlated with long-run development.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I exploit a historic institutional discontinuity—namely, the exogenously 
imposed prohibition of slavery in 88 of 159 Georgian counties from 1735 to 1751—as an 
“intention-to-treat” with subsequently lower slave intensity, in order to analyze the effects of 
slavery on long-run economic development.  By comparing average outcomes in counties 
affected by the initial ban to average outcomes in contiguous border counties not affected by 
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the ban, and including a rich set of geographic covariates, I am furthermore able to control for 
unobservable county characteristics that may have been correlated both with treatment and 
subsequent differences in observed outcomes. 
I find that belonging to Trustee Georgia during the period of the ban had a significant, 
positive effect on income and negative effect on poverty rates over the very long run, and that 
these relationships are largely accounted for by the effect of Trusteeship on subsequent slave 
density.  Results further suggest that significant divergence in development between Trustee 
and non-Trustee counties did not occur before the Civil War. 
Exploring possible channels of persistence, I find that by 1860, average cash crop share of 
total crop output and Herfindahl index score of output by category were significantly lower in 
Trustee counties than in contiguous non-Trustee counties unaffected by the initial slave ban, 
indicating that Trustee county economies were significantly more diversified by the eve of the 
Civil War than non-Trustee counties. In particular, per capita production of orchard, market 
garden, homemade manufactures, and livestock was $105.14 higher in Trustee versus non-
Trustee counties. Moreover, including Herfindahl score and cash crop share of total crop output 
in 1860 as explanatory variables attenuates the estimated relationship between Trusteeship 
and 2010 income and yields large, negative estimated coefficients on both variables, which 
suggests that less economic diversification was a significant channel through which slavery 
impacted long-run development.  In contrast, I also find that counties affected by the initial 
slave ban did not have significant differences in pre-Civil War levels of land inequality, 
educational investment, or rail and water transport links, suggesting economic inequality and 
differential provision of public goods were not significant channels through which slavery 
affected long-run economic development. 
The results of this paper therefore lend additional support to the hypothesis that slavery 
had a persistent, negative effect on long-run economic development, and furthermore provide 
20 
 
new evidence that greater dependence on cash crops and lower diversification of economic 
output were important channels through which slavery affected long-run outcomes, particularly 
after 1860.  Further research is needed, however, to clarify the mechanisms by which greater 
reliance on the cash crops of cane sugar, cotton, indigo, rice, and tobacco, and lower output 
diversification overall in formerly slave-intensive counties affected long-run divergence in 
economic outcomes, and why this divergence did not occur until the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 
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Figure 1: Province of Georgia Border Counties 
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Slave 
Population 
Ratio
Fraction of 
Farms >10 
Slaves
(Log) 2010 
Median Income
Poverty Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Main Sample
1860 -0.098*** -0.081**
(0.04) (0.03)
2010 0.141*** -4.091***
(0.04) (1.01)
N 130 130 159 159
R 2 0.108 0.104 0.159 0.183
Panel B: Border Sample
1860 -0.105* -0.062
(0.05) (0.06)
2010 0.113* -2.783**
(0.06) (1.26)
N 51 51 64 64
R 2 0.126 0.103 0.530 0.550
Notes : Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels of the indicated dependent 
variable in the indicated year for Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  All regressions control 
for  latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean elevation, mean annual temperature and 
precipitation, and land and water area.  Panel A results are for the main sample of all Georgian 
counties, Panel B for the sub-sample of border counties.  Panel B regressions additionally 
control for contiguous border county pairs.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
and clustered at the county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
Table 1: Slavery, Income, and Poverty by Trustee Status
27 
 
 
 
Median Income Poverty Rate
(1) (2)
Panel A: Main Sample
Trustee 0.049 -3.106***
(0.05) (1.02)
Slave Density -0.258* 5.432**
(0.14) (2.63)
N 130 130
R 2 0.167 0.192
Panel B: Border Sample
Trustee 0.044 -2.025
(0.06) (2.22)
Slave Density -0.306* 10.316*
(0.18) (5.13)
N 51 51
R 2 0.371 0.578
Table 2: 2010 Income and Poverty Rate by Trustee Status 
and Slave Density
Notes : Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels 
of the indicated dependent variable in the indicated year.  All 
regressions control for  latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean 
elevation, mean annual temperature and precipitation, and land and 
water area.  Panel A results are for the main sample of all Georgian 
counties, Panel B for the sub-sample of border counties.  Panel B 
regressions additionally control for contiguous border county pairs.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at 
the county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wealth per 
Capita
Output per 
Capita
Water Transport
Railroad 
Transport
Manufacturing 
Establishments
(Log)Capital 
Invested in 
Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Main Sample
1860 -20.714 -11.321 0.001 0.014 -5.753 0.191
(67.19) (13.37) (0.09) (0.14) (6.11) (0.393)
1900 6202.796**
(2919.17)
N 130 /130 130 130 130 130 130
R 2 0.103 / 0.130 0.238 0.224 0.056 0.033 0.027
Panel B: Border Sample
1860 -274.363** -7.356 -0.018 -0.190 -12.385 -0.635
(127.05) (17.74) (0.16) (0.23) (13.15) (0.41)
1900 17464.770
(11668.38) (17.74) (0.16) (0.23) (13.15) (0.41)
N 51 / 53 51 51 51 51 51
R 2 0.456 / 0.134 0.110 0.513 0.354 0.204 0.332
Table 3: Wealth, Output, Transport, and Manufacturing by Trustee Status
Notes: Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels of the indicated dependent variable in the indicated year for Trustee 
versus non-Trustee counties.  All regressions control for  latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean elevation, mean annual temperature 
and precipitation, and land and water area.  Panel A results are for the main sample of all Georgian counties, Panel B for the sub-sample of 
border counties.  Panel B regressions additionally control for contiguous border county pairs.  Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and clustered at the county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Adult Literacy 
Rate
School 
Enrollment Rate
Colleges Public Schools Academies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Main Sample
1850 0.088** -0.034 0.014 -3.664* -0.267
(0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (2.03) (0.64)
N 93 93 93 93 93
R 2 0.174 0.403 0.133 0.291 0.245
Panel B: Border Sample
1850 0.038** 0.019 -0.031 -0.946 -0.495
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (1.84) (0.78)
N 43 43 43 43 43
R 2 0.390 0.547 0.499 0.606 0.497
Table 4: Literacy, School Enrollment, and Educational Establishments by Trustee Status
Notes: Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels of the indicated dependent variable in the indicated 
year for Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  All regressions control for  latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean 
elevation, mean annual temperature and precipitation, and land and water area.  Regressions for columns (3), (4), and (5) 
additionally control for county population in 1850.  Panel A results are for the main sample of all Georgian counties, Panel 
B for the sub-sample of border counties.  Panel B regressions additionally control for contiguous border county pairs.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Land Gini 
Coefficient
Fraction of 
Farms >500 
Acres
Sharecropping 
Share of all 
Farms
Herfindahl Index 
of Total Output 
Diversity
Cash Crop Share 
of Crop Output
Orchard, Market 
Garden, 
Homemade 
Manufactures, 
and Livestock 
Output per 
Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Main Sample
1784 0.057** -0.053**
(0.02) (0.02)
1860 0.032* -0.017 -0.019*** -0.085*** 86.127**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (39.79)
1900 -0.098**
(0.05)
1940 -0.041* -0.073* 0.033
(0.02) (0.04) (0.034)
N 32 / 130 32 / 130 135 / 159 130 / 159 130 / 159 130
R 2 0.410 / 0.129 0.251 / 0.110 0.250 / 0.400 0.197 / 0.341 0.172 / 0.409 0.226
Panel B: Border Sample
1860 0.025 -0.023 -0.021* -0.037* 105.136***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (34.68)
1900 -0.078*
(0.04)
1940 -0.066* -0.136** 0.022
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
N 51 51 53 / 64 51 / 64 51 /64 51
R 2 0.600 0.374 0.715 / 0.414 0.444 / 0.523 0.570 / 0.346 0.571
Table 5: Land Inequality, Tenancy, and Output by Trustee Status
Notes: Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels of the indicated dependent variable in the indicated year for Trustee versus 
non-Trustee counties.  All regressions control for  latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean elevation, mean annual temperature and 
precipitation, and land and water area.  Panel A results are for the main sample of all Georgian counties, Panel B for the sub-sample of border 
counties.  Panel B regressions additionally control for contiguous border county pairs.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
clustered at the county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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(1) (2) (3)
Trustee 0.013 0.031 0.023
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
1860 Cash Crop Share -0.317* -0.193
(0.18) (0.20)
1860 Herfindahl -1.890** -1.452*
(0.77) (0.86)
N 130 130 130
R 2 0.209 0.215 0.222
Table 6: 2010 Income by Trustee Status and Economic Diversity
(Log) 2010 Median Income
Notes: Each column reports estimated coefficients for average levels of the indicated dependent 
variable in the indicated year for Trustee versus non-Trustee counties.  All regressions control for  
latitude, longitude, primary soil type, mean elevation, mean annual temperature and precipitation, 
and land and water area.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the 
county level.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
